Public Citizen Urges Supreme Court to Uphold Campaign Finance Reform Law

Overturning Campaign Finance Restrictions Would Allow Corporations to Dominate Elections

WASHINGTON, D.C. - Public Citizen joined a team of other attorneys in submitting a friend-of-the-court brief to the U.S. Supreme Court today, urging the court to adhere to its precedents and reaffirm the longstanding principle that corporations may not engage in unfettered campaign spending.

The brief filed in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission argues that if the Supreme Court overrules past decisions and strikes down portions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), corporations would be free to mobilize their vast assets as political "war chests" and could soon come to dominate electoral discourse. Ruling against BCRA would not only condemn its electioneering provisions, but also the decades-old requirement that corporations make campaign expenditures only through political action committees (PACs) funded by individual donations, not from their corporate treasuries.

"This has become one of the most important campaign finance cases of our generation," said Public Citizen attorney Scott Nelson, who coauthored the brief with former U.S. Solicitor General Seth Waxman and his partners Randy Moss and Roger Witten of the law firm Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP, as well as former Public Citizen Litigation Group Director Alan Morrison, currently on the faculty of the George Washington University Law School.

The case involves the abortive plan of a right-wing group, Citizens United, to broadcast Hillary: The Movie, which a lower court found to be electioneering subject to BCRA. Among other things, BCRA prevents corporations from funding broadcasts containing candidate advocacy except through segregated funds, or PACs, with all money donated by individuals. Citizens United admittedly did not comply with those restrictions.

After hearing argument in the case in March, the Supreme Court announced that it wanted to hear additional argument on whether two of its key precedents allowing limitations on for-profit corporations’ ability to use corporate funds for electoral purposes should be overruled. The brief filed today on behalf of the principal congressional sponsors of BCRA (Sens. John McCain and Russ Feingold and former Reps. Chris Shays and Marty Meehan) strongly urges the court to uphold BCRA’s constitutionality.

Now at issue in the case is whether the court should overrule Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, which held that the government can limit for-profit corporations to the use of PACs to fund express electoral advocacy, and McConnell v. FEC, which applied that principle to uphold the constitutionality of BCRA’s "electioneering communications" provisions, which restrict corporate funding of election-eve broadcasts that mention candidates and convey unmistakable electoral messages.

The brief submitted on behalf of the BCRA sponsors urges that "[o]verruling Austin or McConnell in this case would be unwarranted and unseemly" and that the principle of respect for the court’s precedents requires a "special justification" - which is absent here - before the court may take such a drastic step. The decisions, the brief contends, "are vital cornerstones of modern campaign finance" and "[o]verruling them would severely jolt our political system."

The case will be reargued on Sept. 9.

US Supreme Court Restricts Police Searches of Cars

US Supreme Court lays down rule forbidding warrantless car searches except in cases of officer safety or evidence protection

Arizona v. Grant Upheld, 4th Amendment Rights Restored

In a decision which seems to have gone largely unnoticed by the major news media, the US Supreme Court on Tuesday narrowed the permissible scope of warrantless automobile searches.

The high court’s 5-4 decision upheld a 2007 Arizona Supreme Court ruling which cited the 1969 California v. Chimel US Supreme Court case concluding that police must obtain a warrant before searching a car in the absence of any threat to officer safety or ability of the suspect to destroy evidence.

The Arizona ruling went counter to a nationwide trend diminishing constitutional protections against unwarranted searches.

Justice John Paul Stevens wrote for the majority, citing former Justice Sandra Day O'Connor:

"Lower court decisions seem now to treat the ability to search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent occupant as a police entitlement rather than as an exception justified by the twin rationales of Chimel."

Since a 1981 decision, New York v. Belton, effectively threw the fourth amendment out the window—at least where traffic stops are concerned—police have been able to use “officer safety” or “protection of evidence” as an excuse to search a vehicle even though the vehicle is unoccupied and there is, therefore, absolutely no threat to the officer or evidence.

The new ruling does not completely overturn New York v. Belton but narrows its implications, preventing police from using unrelated minor offenses to justify drug searches without probable cause: Car searches without probable cause are valid only "if it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle" or if the suspect might be able to access the car for weapons.

The case at hand spent nearly a decade bouncing through the Arizona courts, beginning 25 August 1999 when two Tucson police officers received a "tip" that drug activity took place at a certain location. Police went to said location and questioned Rodney Gant who happened to open the door. After leaving, the officers looked up Gant's record and found an outstanding arrest warrant for driving under a suspended license. Big-time criminal, he.

The officers waited for Gant to return to the house, arresting him after he parked his car safely in the driveway. Gant was placed in the back of a squad car within minutes and without incident. Police then proceeded to search Gant's car where they found a small plastic bag containing cocaine.

A majority lead by Justice Stevens found the search of Gant's car unconstitutional.

"The state seriously undervalues the privacy interests at stake. Although we have recognized that a motorist's privacy interest in his vehicle is less substantial than in his home, the former interest is nevertheless important and deserving of constitutional protection. A rule that gives police the power to conduct such a search whenever an individual is caught committing a traffic offense, when there is no basis for believing evidence of the offense might be found in the vehicle, creates a serious and recurring threat to the privacy of countless individuals. Indeed, the character of that threat implicates the central concern underlying the Fourth Amendment—the concern about giving police officers unbridled discretion to rummage at will among a person's private effects."

The high court did leave police with a broad prospect for conducting warrantless searches but closed the door to searches based solely on traffic violations.

"Although it does not follow from Chimel, we also conclude that circumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle," Stevens wrote. "In many cases, as when a recent occupant is arrested for a traffic violation, there will be no reasonable basis to believe the vehicle contains relevant evidence."

Less than a day after the decision was released, the Michigan State Police issued guidance to officers on how to bypass the supreme court's new limitations:

"While this ruling will impact how searches of vehicles incident to arrest are conducted, officers may still conduct a full search of a person incident to a lawful arrest… In addition, officers may search vehicles using other exceptions to the warrant requirement.” (e.g. probable cause, inventory, tricking a motorist into giving consent).

A copy of the Supreme Court's decision is available as a PDF file: 07-542 Arizona v. Gant (4/21/2009)